Disenfranchisement of Homeless Persons by Smith, Edward J.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 31 Homeless Symposium | CERCLA Symposium
January 1987
Disenfranchisement of Homeless Persons
Edward J. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Homeless Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward J. Smith, Disenfranchisement of Homeless Persons, 31 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 225 (1987)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/10
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF
HOMELESS PERSONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Over a century ago, John Stuart Mill, in his commentary on democ-
racy, wrote that "it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one,
unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of hav-
ing his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the
same interests as other people."' Mill's theory reflects competing val-
ues on suffrage that still exist today: an individual's fundamental right
to vote versus society's interest in preserving its political community.
The historical concept of preserving the political community is
founded upon the belief that only those persons who have sufficient
interests in a district have a right to vote in that district.2 Indicia for
determining which interests are sufficient have included the voter's
wealth, gender, and duration of residence.3
Today, the primary indicia for determining voter qualification is the
I. J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 169 (Gate-
way ed. 1962). Mill's treatise is a systematic survey of the chief problems of a represen-
tative form of political organization. In chapter seven of his work, he outlines which
persons should be entitled to vote. Interestingly, homeless persons fall within one of the
few groups of person that he believes are not entitled to suffrage. In Mill's view, any
person receiving "parish relief," or in modem terms, welfare, should not be permitted to
vote. Id. at 174. He wrote, "By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the
community for actual subsistence, [the homeless person] abdicates his claim to equal
rights with them in other respects." Id. Poll and property taxes as preconditions to the
right to vote reflect Mill's concept of disenfranchisement based on wealth qualifications.
See infra note 3-17 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of the concept of political community, see infra notes 12-15 and
accompanying text.
3. The Supreme Court struck down wealth and durational residency requirements
as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year dura-
tional residency requirements violate equal protection and the right to travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("[w]ealth or fee paying has ... no
relation to voting qualifications").
Correspondingly, the Constitution extends the right of suffrage to women through the
nineteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend XIX. For a complete discussion of voter
qualifications and constitutional requirements, see infra notes 16-30 and accompanying
text.
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residency requirement.' In determining residence, state election laws
generally require persons to have a traditional home or domicile in the
district before they may register to vote.' The requirement of a tradi-
tional home, however, effectively disenfranchises an estimated three
million American citizens who are homeless.6 This Recent Develop-
ment will provide a brief history of the right to vote and contrast this
history with recent decisions and statutory enactments that have ex-
tended the right to vote to the homeless.
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND PRESERVATION OF THE
POLITICAL COMMUNITY
A. Fundamental Concerns
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the right to exercise
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is a "fundamental polit-
ical right"7 that is necessary to preserve all other rights. Notwith-
standing the importance of this right, the right to vote is not
specifically defined by the Federal Constitution' or its amendments.9
4. The Supreme Court recognized a state's legitimate interest in requiring, for voter
qualification, bona fide residency within its boundaries in Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405
U.S. 330, 343 (1972). For a discussion of Dunn, see infra notes 22-32 and accompany-
ing text.
5. Although each state has its own particular election laws that define "residence,"
New York's provision is a typical definition: "[a] place where a person maintains a
fixed, permanent and principle home and to which he, wherever temporarily located,
always intends to return." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104(22) (McKinney 1978). This defi-
nition forecloses homeless persons from registering to vote because they have no fixed,
permanent home or location.
6. Although estimates of the true number of homeless persons vary greatly, three
million is not an unrealistic number. See C. HARTMAN, D. KEATING & R. LEGATES,
DISPLACEMENT: How TO FIGHT IT 3 (1982). This estimate includes all persons dis-
placed from their homes due to revitalization of neighborhoods, eviction, economic de-
velopments, and rent inflation.
7. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). See also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ( all other
rights guaranteed by our nation are illusory if the right to vote is undermined),
8. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (the "[p]rivilege of voting is not
derived from United States, but is conferred by the state . . . ."). See also United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (the Constitution does not confer the right of
suffrage upon anyone).
The right to vote for members of Congress is sometimes referred to as a federal right
to vote, even though article I, § 4 and article II, § 1 of the Federal Constitution author-
ize the states to exercise their power to regulate elections. Thus, the voter qualifications
a state adopts for the purposes of its own elections also apply to elections for members
of Congress. For a good discussion of the federal right to vote as opposed to a deriva-
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Citizens derive the right to vote from the state and exercise this right as
state election laws direct and on the terms the state deems proper.1 °
State legislatures can define voter qualifications and regulate election
procedures.' 1 Courts have repeatedly recognized a state's historical
right to preserve its political community and insure the purity of the
ballot box. 2 The state's primary concern is to prevent nonresidents
from temporarily invading a district and fraudulently electing a
candidate. 3
Historically, states defended these requirements as necessary to in-
sure that a voter had become a member of the community and as such
had a common interest in issues pertaining to the community. Argua-
bly, this "common interest" factor would also encourage a voter to
tive state right, see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). See also Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (the right to vote for members of Congress, although
not definitely conferred on any class of persons, is fundamentally based on the Federal
Constitution).
9. The Constitution contains three amendments that specifically protect the individ-
ual's right to vote. The fifteenth amendment provides that the states shall not abridge
the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XV. The nineteenth amendment provides for protection of the right to
vote from abridgment "on account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The twenty-
sixth amendment extends the franchise to all persons eighteen years of age or older.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
10. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1903); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277
(1937). States are, however, subject to certain limitations in establishing voter qualifica-
tions under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection and due process provisions.
See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
11. For a complete discussion of state power to regulate voting qualifications and
procedures, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 765-
802 (2d ed. 1983).
12. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1971). See also Evans v. Cornman, 398
U.S. 419, 422 (1970) (states have broad powers to determine conditions for right of
suffrage); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969) (states have the
power to impose reasonable requirements on the availability of the ballot).
13. In Dunn the Court held that prevention of such fraud is a legitimate and com-
pelling state goal. 405 U.S. at 345. The impurities the state fears are often called "dual
voting" or "colonization." Dual voting occurs when nonresidents vote in multiple dis-
tricts during the same election. Colonization occurs when nonresidents invade a single
district to flood an election.
The fear of colonization is especially applicable in denying the franchise to homeless
persons. Because homeless persons are arguably transient by definition, they are capa-
ble of colonizing in one particular district merely to elect a certain candidate. Betty
Dolan, an Executive Director of the New York Board of Elections, gave this as a justifi-
cation for the disenfranchisement of homeless persons in New York. The Today Show,
(NBC television broadcast, June 14, 1986).
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exercise his right more intelligently. The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly rejected the "common interest" argument as sufficient to justify
disenfranchisement.14
In sum, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state has a compel-
ling interest in preserving its political community.' 5 The means of ef-
fectuating these interests, however, are subject to court review to insure
that persons are not wrongfully disenfranchised.
B. Constitutional Limitations
Legislative enactments regulating voter qualifications and voting
procedures must meet the general rule that all elections be free and
equal. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that citizens have a
"constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."1 6 If a state grants the right
to vote to some persons and denies the franchise to others, the Court
requires that the exclusions be "necessary" to promote a "compelling
state interest."' 7 Thus, whenever a class of voters is totally disen-
franchised, the Court will invoke a strict standard of review regardless
of whether a traditionally suspect class is involved. 18
Although the Court has invalidated numerous state voting require-
14. Tennessee asserted the "common interest" justification in Dunn to justify its
voter durational residency requirement. 405 U.S. at 345. In unequivocal terms, the
Court rejected the argument. Id. For a discussion of Dunn, see infra notes 22-32 and
accompanying text.
15. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1978); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
16. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970). In addition, the Court has held
that "wealth or fee paying has . . .no relation to voting qualifications." Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(a)
(1982) (poll taxes may not deny eligible voters the constitutional right to vote).
17. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). In
Kramer the Court stated that "[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legiti-
macy of representative government" and that "[s]tatutes granting the franchise to resi-
dents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective
voice in the government affairs which substantially affect their lives." Id.
18. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 345. It has been argued that notwithstand-
ing this rule, homeless persons should fall within a "suspect" class. Homeless persons
are a politically powerless group due to their lack of financial resources and their ulti-
mate disenfranchisement. Justice Marshall, in reviewing a case on the right to sleep in
District of Columbia parks, expressed these concerns on the plight of the homeless.
Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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ments by applying strict scrutiny, 9 it consistently upholds the states'
historic power to limit the political community to "bona fide" residents
of the community.2" Statutory restrictions that purport to establish a
means for distinguishing between bona fide residents and non-residents
are subject to strict scrutiny.2 1 In Dunn v. Blumstein2 2 the Court held
that Tennessee's one year durational residency requirement was uncon-
stitutional.2" The Court found that the requirement impermissibly
burdened the right to vote24 and the right to travel freely among the
states.2 5
In Dunn the state asserted that the durational residency requirement
was necessary to prevent fraud,2 6 to preserve the purity of the ballot,2 7
19. For a discussion of the various impermissible voting restrictions the Court has
struck down, see Note, The Constitutionality of Differential Voting Schemes for Govern-
ments of Limited Purposes: A Moral Problem With Equal Protection Overtones, 7 WHIT-
TIER L. REv. 969 (1985).
20. Although courts are undecided as to what constitutes a bona fide resident, they
have established criteria for determining residency in general. Courts interpret the term
"resident" as equivalent to "domicile." See Note, Disenfranchisement of the College
Student Vote: When A Resident Is Not A Resident, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 489, 494
(1983). At common law, courts determined domicile or residence by examining a per-
son's express intent, conduct, and surrounding circumstances indicating permanent lo-
cation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971).
2 1. An argument exists that rational basis scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, is the proper
analysis of state-imposed residency requirements because these requirements fall within
a state's general police power. See Note, State Restrictions On Municipal Elections: An
Equal Protection Analysis, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1491, 1496 (1980). Because the Court has
unequivocally established that the right to vote is a fundamental right that must be
freely and equally extended to all citizens, courts generally apply the strict scrutiny test.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886).
22. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
23. Tennessee law required that a voter be a resident of the state for one year prior
to registration. Id. at 334.
24. The Court found that the state violated the right to vote under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment because the residency requirement wrongfully
discriminated between old and new residents. Id. at 335-36.
25. The Court found that strict scrutiny was necessary because the law infringed on
the petitioner's fundamental right to travel. Id. at 338. The Court, after reviewing
several cases, stated that "it is clear that the freedom to travel includes the 'freedom to
enter and abide in any state in the Union."' Id. at 338 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 285 (1974)). The Court held that the statute impermissibly infringed upon
this right because it penalized persons who wished to travel by withholding their right
to vote for one year. 405 U.S. at 338.
Although the courts have not yet faced the issue, a homeless litigant might rely on the
fundamental right to travel when challenging state voter residency requirements.
26. 405 U.S. at 345.
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and to identify a knowledgable electorate who were members of the
community. 28 The Court, relying on prior durational residency
cases, 29 applied the strict scrutiny test and found the state's require-
ments unconstitutional.3 ° The Court noted that although the state had
a compelling interest in preserving its political community, the one
year residency requirement was too broadly tailored to serve that inter-
est. 3 Strict scrutiny is not always fatal to residency requirements, for
the Dunn Court, in dicta, unequivocally noted that "[a]n appropriately
defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may
be necessary to preserve the basic concept of a political community,
and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny.
' 32
C. Residency Requirements
Apart from durational residency requirements, the definition of resi-
dency also determines a person's ability to vote. State legislatures have
carefully defined which persons are bona fide residents for voting pur-
poses.33 States generally employ residency tests that focus on the
voter's permanent abode or the location where a voter intends to return
after temporary absence.34
State residency provisions represent an attempt to codify common
27. Id.
28. The state's primary interest was the historical concern of dual voting and colo-
nization. Id. at 345. For an explanation of dual voting and colonization, see supra note
13. The Court, however, rejected the state's asserted interest of promoting knowledgea-
ble voters. 405 U.S. at 355.
29. Id. at 336. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (residents of a
federal enclave in Maryland are residents for state voting purposes); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (servicemen must be allowed to rebut presumption of nonresi-
dency imposed by state constitution).
30. The Court in Dunn stated the test as whether "the exclusions are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest." 405 U.S. at 337 (citing Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969)) (emphasis added).
31. The Court found that the state could accomplish its objectives of assuming
'bona fide' residency in a shorter period of time. Id. at 353. The Court specifically
noted that the Federal Voting Rights Act abolished a durational residency requirement
and requires merely a 30 day registration period. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l (1982). Cur-
rently, states have generally adopted the federal 30 day scheme. For a discussion of
voter registration, see Stone, Voter Registration: Context and Results, 17 URn. LAW.
519 (1985) (special conference on voting rights and the democratic process).
32. 405 U.S. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
33. For a discussion of residency requirements, see A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON,
THE ELECTION PROCESS: VOTING LAWS AND PROCEDURES 7-19 (2d ed. 1980).
34. Id. at 12. See also B. BERNARD, ELECTION LAWS 10 (1950).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/10
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF HOMELESS PERSONS
law. Under common law, courts construed residency as synonymous
with domicile for voting purposes. Courts define domicile as a physical
presence with a present intention to remain at a locale.3 5
The greatest controversy with respect to voter registration concerns
the determination of what constitutes adequate manifestation of intent.
Generally, a voter's declarations and acts demonstrate his intent to
make a place his domicile.3 6 Of these two, courts give the greatest
weight to a person's acts as an indication of intent.3 7 Formal declara-
tions of intent, therefore, are usually insufficient to prove domicile.3 8
Thus, voter registration officials historically focus on whether a per-
son maintains a traditional home within the district.39 The rationale
for this focus is that a person who maintains a home in a district
manifests an intention to remain in that district.'
35. Dane v. Board of Registrars, 374 Mass. 152, 371 N.E.2d 1358 (1978) ("reside,"
as it appears in constitution and statutory provisions, means domicile); see also Lloyd v.
Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979); Hubbard v. McKey, 193 So. 2d 129 (Miss.
1966).
Most courts and state statutes use the term "resident" to define voter eligibility. See,
e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965). This use is inaccurate, however, be-
cause a person may have more than one residence, while having only one domicile. For
a succinct discussion of domicile and residency for voting purposes, see Note, supra note
20, at 498-513.
36. Booth v. Smith, 261 Ark. 838, 839, 552 S.W.2d 19, 20 (1977) (in resolving issues
of residency, officials correctly consider the voter's intent together with his conduct);
Cesar v. Onondaga Bd. of Election, 54 A.D.2d 1108, 1109, 389 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59, appeal
dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 1079, 360 N.E.2d 964, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1976) (twin require-
ments for establishing residency for voting purposes are intent to reside at a fixed place
and conduct that manifests that intent).
37. In re Falcher, 107 Misc. 2d 296, 433 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1980) (determination of
voting residence is factual, based upon actual conduct of person); Gordon v. Blackburn,
618 P.2d 668, 671 (Colo. 1980) (test for legal residence is objective); Pike County School
Dist. v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., 247 Ark. 9, 444 S.W.2d 72 (1969) (voter's conduct
must be consistent with his assertions of residency).
38. The test for domicile requires a subjective intent to establish residency, coupled
with an objective manifestation of this intent. See Note, supra note 20, at 498. As a
matter of proof, election officials usually require fulfillment of the objective prong of the
test because of its inherent reliability. Id.
39. Although election officials do not expressly acknowledge this primary focus, the
lack of a traditional home address prevents a person from establishing his residency.
See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
40. Pitts v. Blacks, 608 F. Supp. 696, 700 (S.D. N.Y. 1984) (election board asserted
that requirement of a fixed premise is the only way to ascertain the validity of a person's
residence). For a discussion of Pitts, see infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE RIGHT OF HOMELESS
PERSONS TO VOTE
Today, millions of persons are without traditional homes, forced to
live in shelters, parks, streets, and alleys.41 Until recently, these people
were also without the right to vote due to their inability to satisfy state
residence or domicile requirements. Homeless persons, by definition,
do not possess the physical manifestation of permanence that is a pre-
requisite to voter registration.
In 1984 election boards in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia enacted registration procedures that permit homeless
persons to vote.42 Following these examples, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in Pitts v. Black,43 held
that New York's traditional voter residence requirement unconstitu-
tionally disenfranchised the homeless.
A. Constitutional Requirements-Pitts v. Black
In Pitts a group of homeless individuals brought a class action
against New York City and state election officials to enjoin the officials
from applying state law to completely disenfranchise the plaintiff
class.' The court limited its review to petitioners' equal protection
claims and the interpretation of "residence" as a voting requirement
under section 1-104(22) of the state election law.45 Section 1-104(22)
defined residence as "that place where a person maintains a fixed, per-
manent and principal home to which he, wherever temporarily located,
always intends to return. 46
Plaintiffs alleged that they were homeless persons who resided in the
State of New York, but were without traditional homes.47 They fur-
ther alleged that election officials refused to let them register to vote
because they lacked an acceptable "residential address."'4 8
41. See supra note 6.
42. For a discussion of the specifics of these statutory schemes, see infra notes 60-66
and accompanying text.
43. 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
44. Id. at 697.
45. Id. at 698. Petitioners, in addition to their federal claim, sought relief on state
constitutional grounds. Id.
46. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104(22) (McKinney 1978).
47. 608 F. Supp. at 697.
48. Plaintiffs received a form letter stating that under state law, a shelter was not a
residence. Each of the named plaintiffs met all other state voter eligibility requirements.
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Plaintiffs asserted that the state's traditional definition of residence
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause it disenfranchised homeless persons.4 9 They argued that the
state could less restrictively define "residence" not as a traditional
home, but as a "geographic locale, where one performs the usual func-
tions of sleeping, eating and living in accordance with one's life-
style. . . ."'o The state, in response, argued that a permanent
residential address was necessary to protect the political community
and to efficiently administer the registration system.51
Judge Lowe, writing for the court, found that the election law, as
applied by the state, discriminated between classes of voters.5" The
court stated that because the state's actions placed restrictions on the
fundamental right to vote, the strict scrutiny test applied.53 Applying
this standard, the court relied heavily on plaintiffs' evidence concerning
voting plans permitting the homeless to vote in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, and the District of Columbia.54 Based on the existence of
Each plaintiff was a U.S. citizen, over 18 years of age, and never adjudged incompetent
or convicted of a felony. Finally, none of the named plaintiffs claimed residency for
voting purposes in any other jurisdiction. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Their Motions for a Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification at 6, Pitts v.
Black, 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (No. 84 Div. 5270) [hereinafter Plaintiffs
Memorandum]; see also 608 F. Supp. at 704.
Plaintiffs' class originally included persons who lived in shelters, streets, or parks.
The state, however, stipulated at a preliminary hearing that a shelter was a residence
under § 1-104(22). Id. at n.29. Plaintiffs Pitts and Carter, who were severed out of the
action due to the stipulation, both resided in a municipal shelter run by the Human
Resources Administration for New York City. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra, at 6.
Both individuals received regular mail at the shelter. Id.
The remaining named plaintiff, Dyer, is a homeless New Yorker who, since 1981, has
lived in Grand Central Terminal and city parks. Dyer received mail at a friend's house
and at the Homeless Coalition office. 608 F. Supp. at 706. The court's decision, there-
fore, applies solely to the rights of prospective voters living on the streets or other public
places. Id.
49. Id. at 697.
50. Id. at 698.
51. Id. at 699. The state's interests in protecting the political community were to
ensure that the voter has a verifiable nexus to the voting community, to prevent fraudu-
lent voting, and to effect administrative feasibility. Id. Traditionally, states raise these
issues in voter qualification cases. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
52. 608 F. Supp. at 708.
53. Id. Plaintiffs' claim deserved the "strictest constitutional protection." Id. The
court relied primarily on Dunn v. Blumstein in its analysis. For a discussion of Dunn,
see supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
54. For a detailed discussion of these plans, see infra notes 59-71 and accompanying
1987]
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these plans, which redefine the traditional notion of residency to in-
clude homeless persons, the court found that the state failed to estab-
lish that its traditional definition of residence was narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling interest.55
The court, upon rejecting the state's definition, turned to state com-
mon law to adopt a less restrictive test for residency. 6 The court sug-
gesting a new "home base" definition that permits homeless persons to
identify a specific location within a political community as a resi-
dence." The court defined a person's "home base" as a location "[to]
which they return regularly, manifest an intent to remain for the pres-
ent, and a place from which they can receive messages and be
contacted."58
B. Administrative Standards: The Philadelphia and District of
Columbia Plans
1. The Philadelphia Plan
Another recent federal district court action upheld the right of the
homeless to vote. In Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the
Homeless v. Tartaglione59 the court entered a consent decree holding,
for voter registration purposes, that homeless persons in Philadelphia
satisfied state residency requirements.' Under the decree, homeless
applicants can list the address of the shelter where they have an estab-
lished relationship and which accepts first class mail for the appli-
cant.61 Only public or private non-profit shelters that operate
residential programs for the homeless qualify under the decree. 62 Ac-
55. 608 F. Supp. at 709-10.
56. Interestingly, the federal court, in rejecting the state's interpretation of its own
statute, looked to New York's common law definition of domicile. The court found that
the test for domicile is generally more stringent than the test for residency because a
person may have several residences, but can have only one domicile. Id. at 710.
57. Because a federal court is powerless to force states to interpret their statutes in a
particular fashion, the court could only find that the "home base" definition of residence
was less restrictive. The new test, therefore, was merely a suggestion to the state and
not a binding interpretation.
58. Id. at 710.
59. No. 84-3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984) (unreported order).
60. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 623-1 to -45 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
61. Although the consent decree in Tartaglione is not published, the court in Pitts
provided a good summary of the Philadelphia plan. See Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp.
696, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
62. Id.
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cording to the Philadelphia plan, a homeless person is not required to
live in a shelter as long as he can establish a sufficient relationship with
that shelter.63 The location of the shelter, not where the person actu-
ally lives, determines the election district. 4
2. The District of Columbia Plan
The District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics recently
adopted regulations permitting the registration of homeless persons if
these persons are able to identify a specific location where they pres-
ently intend to remain.65 The board's regulations interpreted the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code to permit a homeless person to register by
specifying both a fixed residence location and an address where they
can receive mail.6 6
63. Id.
64. Id. The Philadelphia plan's allocation of voting districts caused the defendants
in Pitts considerable concern. In Pitts the state argued that dividing the registration
districts into roughly equivalent population districts was not administratively feasible if
the state allowed transient voters to live in one district and vote in another. Id. at 702-
03. The court rejected this argument. Id.
65. In re Jenkins, slip op. at 6 (District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics,
June 7, 1984). In Jenkins the Board reversed the decisions of the Registrar of Voters
and held that a traditional home is not a prerequisite to voter eligibility. The Board
focused on the District of Columbia Code, which defines a residence as "the principal or
primary home or place of abode of a person . . ." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1302(16)(A)
(Supp. 1986). The Board noted that the registrar wrongly focused on an "abode" as a
"thing" instead of the person's intent. Jenkins, slip op. at 4. The Board found that
individuals establish residency by "declarations . .. that he or she resides at the identi-
fied structure ... a possessory interest in one's 'residence' is simply not required." Id.
at 5. The Board concluded that it was sufficient for prospective registrants to identify
any specific location in the District and to display a present intention to remain at that
location. Id. at 6.
66. The District of Columbia municipal regulations specifically provide:
500.6 An applicant for voter registration must provide on the Mail Registration
Application (MRA) a registration address, which address is the applicant's
fixed residence location in the District.
500.7 The information provided to the Board by the voter shall be sufficiently
precise to enable the Board to assign to the voter the appropriate Ward,
Precinct, and Advisory Neighborhood Commission/Single Member Dis-
trict for voting purposes. Where the registration address information is
insufficient to facilitate this procedure, the application shall be rejected by
the Board.
500.8 Any applicant who provides on the MRA a registration address to which
mail cannot be delivered by the U.S. Postal Service shall additionally pro-
vide to the Board a designated mailing address, to facilitate the administra-
tive communications required by law. Failure to provide the designated
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The District of Columbia plan permits a person to use the place
where he sleeps as his residence, even if it is a nontraditional location,
such as a park bench.67 The plan requires that this person provide a
designated mailing address and submit a signed statement that the lo-
cation constitutes the voter's fixed residence.68
The regulations further provide that the board must conduct an an-
nual "voter residency verification mail canvass." 6 9 The board mails
nonforwardable cards to the addresses provided by the registrants.
The voter must sign and return the card within thirty days, or lose
voting privileges. The purpose of the census is to insure that the regis-
tered voter provided correct residence information.
The only substantive difference between the Philadelphia and Dis-
trict of Columbia plans is the determination of the appropriate voting
mailing address as required shall result in the rejection of the registration
application by the Board.
500.9 Any applicant designating a mailing address on the MRA for official com-
munications shall submit a signed statement, on a form provided by the
Board, specifying that the registration address indicated on the MRA con-
stitutes the voter's fixed residence in the District.
500.10 Any applicant utilizing these procedures shall be subject to the same crimi-
nal sanctions pursuant to § 1-1318(a), D.C. Code, 1981 ed., for fraudu-
lently attempting to register to vote that apply to all applicants.
510.5 In order to maintain the voter registry and keep it accurate and current, the
Board shall annually conduct a voter residency verification mail canvass of
all registered voters in the District.
510.6 In conducting the annual canvass, the Board shall mail a nonforwardable
notification to the voter's registration address as it appears in the Board's
voter record's [sic]. In any instance where this nonforwardable notification
is returned by the U.S. Postal Service, the Board shall initiate removal pro-
cedures pursuant to § 1-1311(f)(3), D.C. Code, 1981 ed.
510.7 In conducting the annual residency canvass for voters who have provided
designated mailing addresses to the Board, the Board shall mail nonfor-
wardable confirmation of the registration address to the voter at the desig-
nated mailing address as it appears in the voter records. Failure of the
voter to complete, sign and return to the Board the residence confirmation
form within thirty (30) days of the date of mailing shall initiate removal
procedures pursuant to § 1-1311(f)(3), D.C. Code 1981 ed.
510.8 Any applicant utilizing these procedures shall be subject to the same crimi-
nal sanctions pursuant to § 1-1318(a), D.C. Code, 1981 ed., for fraudu-
lently attempting to register to vote that apply to all applicants.
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, §§ 500.6-.10, 510.5-.8 (1984).
67. See Jenkins, slip op. at 6.
68. Id.
69. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 510. 5 (1984).
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district. Under the Philadelphia plan, the location of the shelter where
the person receives mail determines the voting district.7 ° The District
of Columbia plan determines voting districts by the location the voter
identifies as an actual residence.7 1 Irrespective of this difference, both
plans represent a substantial departure from traditional bona-fide resi-
dence requirements. These plans allow homeless persons, whether liv-
ing in shelters or on streets, a chance to exercise their fundamental
right to vote.
IV. IMPACT
Undoubtedly, the right to vote is a fundamental right that courts
must vigorously protect. 72 Equally important is the compelling state
concern that only bona fide residents are granted the franchise.73
These competing concerns are especially acute when deciding whether
and how homeless persons may vote.
Whether the state determines residence under a traditional perma-
nent address test, under the Pitts "home base" test, or under the "ad-
ministrative intent" test, each definition rests upon the ideal of
identifying the place "which is the center of the individual's life now,
the focus of his primary concern."
74
The Philadelphia and District of Columbia plans are more con-
cerned with discovering an individual's true intentions than is the
traditional residency test. The traditional test wrongly focuses on the
material manifestation of intent to reside in a traditional abode. The
home base test and the administrative test both circumvent the mate-
rial manifestation test by examining the individual's intent and requir-
ing written declaration of this intent.75 The District of Columbia
regulations require the prospective voter to both declare his intention
and provide factual substantiation of this intent by designating a mail-
ing address.76 The District ensures the truthfulness of a registrant's
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. Statement of Edward W. Norton, Chairman, District of Columbia Board of
Elections and Ethics (June 7, 1984). See also D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 500.7 (1984).
72. See supra notes 7, 16-19 and accompanying texts.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
74. Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (Friendly, J.).
75. See, eg., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 500.9 (1984).
76. Id. §§ 500.6-.8. See also supra text accompanying note 61 (Philadelphia plan
allows the homeless to designate as their address shelters at which they have established
a sufficient relationship).
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declaration of intent through criminal sanctions for perjury77 and veri-
fies the declaration by annual mail canvass to the registrant's desig-
nated address.7" This written declaration of intent, coupled with the
act of receiving mail at a designated address, is clearly sufficient to sat-
isfy voter residence or domicile requirements.
These registration plans effectively serve the state's interest in
preventing colonization or dual voting.79 The mail verification process
removes the possibility of transients flooding a district for election pur-
poses, because persons seeking to vote in an election must remain in the
district until the district verifies their residency.8" In addition, the
plans' provisions for criminal sanctions provide a major deterrence to
persons attempting fraudulent vote registration.81 This combination of
administrative control and individual deterrence provides the election
board ample means of preserving the political community. Moreover,
as is evident from Pitts, homeless persons residing in shelters satisfy
existing traditional residency voting requirements.82 These persons
manifest the requisite intent to establish residency because they reside
in a permanent structure to which they intend to return.
Notwithstanding the future effectiveness of the Philadelphia and the
District of Columbia plans, their current implementation creates a new
problem. Homeless litigants challenging traditional voting residency
requirements may rely on these plans as proof of a less restrictive alter-
native to disenfranchisement. Courts applying strict scrutiny to tradi-
tional requirements, as in Pitts,8 3 will find it difficult to uphold them in
light of these less restrictive plans.84
77. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 500.10 (1984).
78. Id. § 510.5.
79. See supra note 13.
80. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 510.5-.7 (1984).
81. See e.g., id. § 500.10.
82. Persons residing in a shelter have the requisite intent and physical presence to
satisfy the traditional residency test. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the residence test. The strength of this argument was possibly a reason
supporting the New York Election Board's stipulation in Pitts that persons living in
shelters could register to vote. See supra note 48 and accompanying test.
83. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text for discussion of Pitts.
84. In Collier v. Menzel, 176 Cal. App. 3d 24, 36, 221 Cal. Rptr. 110, 117 (1985),
the California Court of Appeal followed the Pitts decision and held that denying the
right to vote to applicants who listed a city park as a residence violated the equal protec-
tion clause.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/10
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V. CONCLUSION
The word "election" in our nation connotes an embodiment of the
popular will; the expression of the citizens' sovereign power. This right
should not exist solely for individuals capable of identifying a posses-
sory interest sufficient to meet the "traditional home" residency re-
quirement. The Philadelphia and District of Columbia plans are the
beginning of necessary procedures designed to insure that all citizens of
the United States, whether living in a traditional home or on a park
bench, have the fundamental right to vote.
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